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CHIEF RICHARD COOK, in his Official Capacity as Chief 
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY;  
ROBERT JONES, in his Official Capacity as Chief of the 
Hammonton, New Jersey Police Department                                                                                        
__________ 
 
2 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-06110) 
District Judge: Honorable William H. Walls 
__________ 
 
Argued February 12, 2013 
 
Before: HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges, and 
STARK,

 District Judge. 
 
(Filed: July 31, 2013) 
 
David D. Jensen 
David Jensen PLLC 
Suite 230 
111 John Street 
New York, NY 10038  
 
Alan Gura [Argued] 
Gura & Possessky, PLLC 
101 North Columbus Street 
Suite 405 
Alexandria, VA 22314 
 
 Attorneys for the Appellants 
 
 
 
                                              

 The Honorable Leonard P. Stark, Judge of the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware, sitting by 
designation. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
Four New Jersey residents and two organizations 
(collectively “Appellants”) appeal from a judgment of the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
that held constitutional N.J.S.A. § 2C:58-4, a New Jersey law 
regulating the issuance of permits to carry handguns in public 
4 
 
(“Handgun Permit Law”). Appellants contend that the District 
Court erred because (1) the Second Amendment secures a 
right to carry arms in public for self-defense; (2) the 
“justifiable need” standard of the Handgun Permit Law is an 
unconstitutional prior restraint; and (3) the standard fails any 
level of means-end scrutiny a court may apply. We will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
I. 
 
 Permits to carry handguns are “the most closely 
regulated aspect” of New Jersey’s gun control laws. In re 
Preis, 573 A.2d 148, 150 (N.J. 1990). Individuals who wish to 
carry a handgun in public for self-defense must first obtain a 
license. N.J.S.A. § 2C:39-5(b).
1
 The process and standard for 
obtaining such a license is found in New Jersey’s Handgun 
Permit Law, N.J.S.A. § 2C:58-4.  
 
 Under New Jersey’s Handgun Permit Law, individuals 
who desire a permit to carry a handgun in public must apply 
to the chief police officer in their municipality or to the 
superintendent of the state police. N.J.S.A. § 2C:58-4(c). The 
chief police officer or superintendent considers the 
application in accordance with the following provisions of the 
Handgun Permit Law: 
                                              
1
 For exemptions to the general rule that individuals may not 
carry a handgun in public without a permit, see N.J.S.A. § 
2C:39-6. For example, individuals employed in certain 
occupations may carry a firearm “in the performance of their 
official duties,” see, e.g., N.J.S.A. § 2C:39-6(a)(2), and 
individuals may carry a firearm “in the woods or fields . . . for 
the purpose of hunting,” see N.J.S.A. § 2C:39-6(f)(2). 
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No application shall be approved by the chief 
police officer or the superintendent unless the 
applicant demonstrates that he is not subject to 
any of the disabilities set forth in 2C:58-3c. 
[which includes numerous criminal history, age 
and mental health requirements], that he is 
thoroughly familiar with the safe handling and 
use of handguns, and that he has a justifiable 
need to carry a handgun.  
Id. (emphasis added). The meaning of “justifiable need,” as it 
appears in this provision, is codified in the New Jersey 
Administrative Code as follows: 
[T]he urgent necessity for self-protection, as 
evidenced by specific threats or previous attacks 
which demonstrate a special danger to the 
applicant’s life that cannot be avoided by means 
other than by issuance of a permit to carry a 
handgun. 
N.J. Admin. Code 13:54-2.4(d)(1).
2
  
                                              
2
 This codification of the “justifiable need” standard closely 
mirrors an earlier explanation of “need” that was laid out by 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Siccardi v. State, 284 
A.2d 533 (N.J. 1971).  See id. at 557 (explaining that New 
Jersey law restricts the issuance of permits to those “who can 
establish an urgent necessity for . . . self-protection,” which 
may be limited to those “whose life is in real danger, as 
evidenced by serious threats or earlier attacks”). Since 
Siccardi, many other New Jersey state court opinions have 
also explained this standard. See In re Preis, 573 A.2d at 152 
(“[T]here must be an urgent necessity [] for self-protection. 
6 
 
 
Next, if the chief police officer or superintendent 
determines that the applicant has met all the requirements, 
including demonstration of a “justifiable need,” the 
application is approved and sent to a superior court judge, 
who: 
shall issue the permit to the applicant if, but 
only if, it is satisfied that the applicant is a 
person of good character who is not subject to 
any of the disabilities set forth in section 2C:58-
3c., that he is thoroughly familiar with the safe 
handling and use of handguns, and that he has a 
justifiable need to carry a handgun. 
N.J.S.A. § 2C:58-4(d). If, alternatively, the chief police 
officer or superintendent determines that the applicant has not 
met the requirements, the applicant “may request a hearing in 
the Superior Court . . . by filing a written request for such a 
hearing within 30 days of the denial.” Id. at § 2C:58-4(e). 
 
II. 
 
                                                                                                     
The requirement is of specific threats or previous attacks 
demonstrating a special danger to the applicant’s life that 
cannot be avoided by other means. Generalized fears for 
personal safety are inadequate . . . .”) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted); In re Pantano, 60 A.3d 507, 510 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (discussing and applying 
“justifiable need” standard); In re Application of Borinsky, 
830 A.2d 507 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (same). 
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Desiring to carry handguns in public for self-defense, 
the individual plaintiffs here each applied for a permit 
according to the process described above. Their applications 
were denied, however, because pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 2C:58-
4(c) either a police official or superior court judge determined 
that they failed to satisfy the “justifiable need” requirement.3 
The organizational plaintiffs asserted that their members and 
supporters have been denied public-carry permits and have 
refrained from applying for permits because they cannot 
demonstrate a “justifiable need” as required by the Handgun 
Permit Law. Appellants sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief, contending that New Jersey may not condition the 
issuance of a public-carry permit on an applicant’s ability to 
demonstrate a “justifiable need.” The District Court rejected 
Appellants’ arguments, and accordingly denied Appellants’ 
motion for summary judgment and granted Appellees’ motion 
to dismiss. Appellants timely appealed.
4
  
                                              
3
 In March 2013, one of the original plaintiffs, Daniel 
Piszczatoski, was granted a permit on other grounds (as a 
retired law enforcement officer) and was dismissed as an 
Appellant. 
4
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 
and 1343, and could consider Appellants’ request for 
declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 
2202. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
determination that the New Jersey Handgun Permit Law is 
constitutional, United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 151 
(3d Cir. 2009); the District Court’s dismissal of Appellants’ 
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 
2008); and the District Court’s denial of Appellants’ motion 
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III. 
 
 This appeal prompts us to consider multiple questions. 
We will consider each in turn following the two-step 
approach this Court set forth in United States v. Marzzarella, 
614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010): 
First, we ask whether the challenged law 
imposes a burden on conduct falling within the 
scope of the Second Amendment’s 
guarantee . . . . If it does not, our inquiry is 
complete. If it does, we evaluate the law under 
some form of means-end scrutiny. If the law 
passes muster under that standard, it is 
constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid. 
Here, we conclude that the requirement that applicants 
demonstrate a “justifiable need” to publicly carry a handgun 
for self-defense qualifies as a “presumptively lawful,” 
“longstanding” regulation and therefore does not burden 
conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment’s 
guarantee. Accordingly, we need not move to the second step 
of Marzzarella. Nevertheless, because of the important 
constitutional issues presented, we believe it to be beneficial 
and appropriate to consider whether the “justifiable need” 
standard withstands the applicable intermediate level of 
scrutiny. We conclude that even if the “justifiable need” 
standard did not qualify as a “presumptively lawful,” 
                                                                                                     
for summary judgment, State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation 
omitted). 
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“longstanding” regulation, at step two of Marzzarella it would 
withstand intermediate scrutiny, providing a second, 
independent basis for concluding that the standard is 
constitutional. 
 
IV. 
 
It remains unsettled whether the individual right to 
bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the 
home.
5
 In 2008, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized for 
the first time that the Second Amendment confers upon 
individuals a right to keep and bear arms for self-defense by 
holding that a District of Columbia law forbidding the 
individual possession of usable handguns in the home 
violated the Second Amendment. See District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). In 2010, the Court 
recognized that the Second Amendment right articulated in 
Heller applied equally to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, — U.S. —, 
130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010). Taken together, these cases 
made clear that “Second Amendment guarantees are at their 
zenith within the home.” Kachalsky v. County of 
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 
                                              
5
 Rather than discussing whether or not the individual right to 
bear arms for the purpose of self-defense articulated in 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) “extends 
beyond the home,” it may be more accurate to discuss 
whether, in the public sphere, a right similar or parallel to the 
right articulated in Heller “exists.” Firearms have always been 
more heavily regulated in the public sphere so, undoubtedly, 
if the right articulated in Heller does “extend beyond the 
home,” it most certainly operates in a different manner.   
10 
 
S. Ct. 1806 (2013). Outside of the home, however, we 
encounter the “vast terra incognita” recognized by the Fourth 
Circuit in United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 485 
(4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011). Compare 
also Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 92 (“[C]ertainly, to some 
degree, [the Second Amendment] must protect the right of 
law-abiding citizens to possess firearms for other, as-yet-
undefined, lawful purposes.”), with Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 
475 (“There may or may not be a Second Amendment right in 
some places beyond the home.”). 
 
Although Heller does not explicitly identify a right to 
publicly carry arms for self- defense, it is possible to conclude 
that Heller implies such a right. The Seventh Circuit reached 
this very conclusion in Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 
(7th Cir. 2012), when it stated that “[t]he Supreme Court has 
decided that the amendment confers a right to bear arms for 
self-defense, which is as important outside the home as 
inside.”6 As the Second Circuit recently explained, however, 
                                              
6
 We note that the Seventh Circuit gave the Illinois legislature 
time to come up with a new law that would survive 
constitutional challenge, implying that some restrictions on 
the right to carry outside the home would be permissible, 
while holding that the challenged law containing a flat ban on 
carrying a handgun in public was unconstitutional. 
Accordingly, on July 9, 2013 Illinois enacted a law requiring 
issuance of concealed carry licenses to individuals meeting 
basic statutory requirements similar to those required for New 
Jersey applicants, but the law does not require applicants to 
show  a “justifiable need.” Discretion in granting concealed 
carry licenses appears to be limited to a determination of 
whether the applicant “pose[s] a danger to himself, herself, or 
11 
 
Heller “was never meant ‘to clarify the entire field’ of Second 
Amendment jurisprudence,” Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89 
(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635), but rather struck down a 
single law that “ran roughshod” over D.C. residents’ 
individual right to possess usable handguns in the home, id. at 
88. Hence, the Seventh Circuit in Moore may have read 
Heller too broadly. As the Seventh Circuit itself had earlier 
stated in United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 
2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011), Heller’s 
language “warns readers not to treat Heller as containing 
broader holdings than the Court set out to establish: that the 
Second Amendment created individual rights, one of which is 
keeping operable handguns at home for self-defense.” Id. 
(emphasis added).  
 
Appellants contend also that “[t]ext, history, tradition 
and precedent all confirm that [individuals] enjoy a right to 
publicly carry arms for their defense.” Appellants’ Brief 12 
(emphasis added). At this time, we are not inclined to address 
this contention by engaging in a round of full-blown historical 
analysis, given other courts’ extensive consideration of the 
history and tradition of the Second Amendment. See, e.g., 
Heller, 554 U.S. at  605-619 (“We now address how the 
Second Amendment was interpreted from immediately after 
its ratification through the end of the 19th century.”). We 
reject Appellants’ contention that a historical analysis leads 
inevitably to the conclusion that the Second Amendment 
confers upon individuals a right to carry handguns in public 
                                                                                                     
others, or a threat to public safety.” Firearm Concealed Carry 
Act, Illinois Public Act 098-0063, available at 
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/98/PDF/098-
0063.pdf.  
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for self-defense. As the Second Circuit observed in 
Kachalsky, “[h]istory and tradition do not speak with one 
voice here. What history demonstrates is that states often 
disagreed as to the scope of the right to bear arms, whether 
the right was embodied in a state constitution or the Second 
Amendment.” 701 F.3d at 91.  
 
For these reasons, we decline to definitively declare 
that the individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-
defense extends beyond the home, the “core” of the right as 
identified by Heller. We do, however, recognize that the 
Second Amendment’s individual right to bear arms may have 
some application beyond the home. Ultimately, as our Court 
did in Marzzarella, we refrain from answering this question 
definitively because it is not necessary to our conclusion.  
 
V. 
 
 Assuming that the Second Amendment individual right 
to bear arms does apply beyond the home, we next consider 
whether or not the requirement that applicants demonstrate a 
“justifiable need” to publicly carry a handgun for self-defense 
burdens conduct within the scope of that Second Amendment 
guarantee. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 92. As this Court has 
stated, certain longstanding regulations are “exceptions” to 
the right to keep and bear arms, such that the conduct they 
regulate is not within the scope of the Second Amendment. 
See United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 
2011); United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 600 (3d Cir. 
2012). Here, we agree with the District Court that even if 
some protected right to carry arms outside the home exists, 
the challenged requirement that applicants demonstrate a 
“justifiable need” to obtain a permit to publicly carry a 
13 
 
handgun for self-defense qualifies as a “longstanding,” 
“presumptively lawful” regulation. 
 
In Heller the Supreme Court noted that nothing in its 
opinion “should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings” 
and identified these “regulatory measures” as “presumptively 
lawful” ones. 554 U.S. at 571, 571 n.26. It then stated that the 
presumptively lawful regulations it identified by name did not 
compose an “exhaustive” list, but the Court did not provide 
guidance on how to identify other regulations that may 
qualify. Id.  
 
Exploring the meaning of “presumptively lawful,” this 
Court has stated that “presumptively lawful” regulatory 
measures are “exceptions to the Second Amendment 
guarantee.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91.7 Acknowledging that 
                                              
7
 As this Court stated in Marzzarella: 
 
We recognize the phrase “presumptively 
lawful” could have different meanings under 
newly enunciated Second Amendment doctrine. 
On the one hand, this language could be read to 
suggest the identified restrictions are 
presumptively lawful because they regulate 
conduct outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment. On the other hand, it may suggest 
the restrictions are presumptively lawful 
because they pass muster under any standard of 
scrutiny. Both readings are reasonable 
14 
 
the exceptions identified in Heller “all derived from historical 
regulations,” the Marzzarella Court stated that “it is not clear 
that pre-ratification presence is the only avenue to a 
categorical exception.” Id. at 93. Although Marzzarella stated 
also that “prudence counsels caution when extending [the] 
recognized [Heller] exceptions to novel regulations 
unmentioned by Heller,” 614 F.3d at 93, we nevertheless 
conclude, for the reasons that follow, that the requirement that 
applicants demonstrate a “justifiable need” to publicly carry a 
handgun for self-defense is a presumptively lawful, 
longstanding licensing provision under the teachings of Heller 
and Marzzarella.  
 
The “justifiable need” standard Appellants challenge 
has existed in New Jersey in some form for nearly 90 years. 
See Siccardi v. State, 284 A.2d 533, 538 (N.J. 1971). 
Beginning in 1924
8
 New Jersey “directed that no persons 
(other than those specifically exempted such as police officers 
and the like) shall carry [concealed] handguns except 
                                                                                                     
interpretations, but we think the better reading, 
based on the text and the structure of Heller, is 
the former—in other words, that these 
longstanding limitations are exceptions to the 
right to bear arms.  
 
614 F.3d at 91. 
8
 In 1905, New Jersey enacted a statute providing for criminal 
punishment of the concealed carrying of “any revolver, pistol, 
[or] firearm,” but allowed an exception for those with 
permits. Compiled Statutes of New Jersey, Vol. II., 1759 
(Soney & Sage 1911). It does not appear, however, that the 
law contained any standards for issuance of such permits. Id. 
15 
 
pursuant to permits issuable only on a showing of ‘need.’” Id. 
(internal citations omitted). In 1966, New Jersey amended its 
laws to prohibit individuals from carrying handguns in public, 
in any manner, without first obtaining a permit, and again 
conditioned the issuance of such permits on a showing of 
need. The predecessor to the Handgun Permit Law 
subsequently underwent multiple revisions, the requirement 
of “need” enduring each, and ultimately the present-day 
standard of “justifiable need” became statutorily enshrined in 
1978.   
 
 New Jersey’s longstanding handgun permitting schema 
is not an anomaly. Many recent judicial opinions have 
discussed historical laws regulating or prohibiting the 
carrying of weapons in public. See, e.g., Peterson v. Martinez, 
707 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2013) (“extending” the 
recognized Heller exceptions to cover regulations on the 
carrying of concealed firearms, stating that “[i]n light of our 
nation’s extensive practice of restricting citizens’ freedom to 
carry firearms in a concealed manner, we hold that this 
activity does not fall within the scope of the Second 
Amendment’s protections”). In the 19th Century, “[m]ost 
states enacted laws banning the carrying of concealed 
weapons,” and “[s]ome states went even further than 
prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons . . . bann[ing] 
concealable weapons (subject to certain exceptions) 
altogether whether carried openly or concealed.” Kachalsky, 
701 F.3d at 95-96. As Appellants correctly note, some state 
courts determined that prohibitions on concealed carrying 
were permissible because open carrying remained available as 
an avenue for public carrying. But those state court 
determinations do not compel us to conclude that the 
“justifiable need” standard, which in New Jersey must be met 
16 
 
to carry openly or concealed, fails to qualify as a 
“longstanding,” “presumptively lawful” exception to the 
Second Amendment guarantee. The “justifiable need” 
standard fits comfortably within the longstanding tradition of 
regulating the public carrying of weapons for self-defense. In 
fact, it does not go as far as some of the historical bans on 
public carrying; rather, it limits the opportunity for public 
carrying to those who can demonstrate a justifiable need to do 
so. See id. at 90 (discussing states that once “banned the 
carrying of pistols and similar weapons in public, both in a 
concealed or an open manner”) (citing Ch. 96, §§ 1–2, 1881 
Ark. Acts at 191–92; Ch. 13, § 1, 1870 Tenn. Acts at 28; Act 
of Apr. 12, 1871, ch. 34, § 1, 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws at 25; Act 
of Dec. 2, 1875, ch. 52, § 1, 1876 Wyo. Terr. Comp. Laws, at 
352).
9
 
 
A close analogue to the New Jersey standard can be 
found in New York’s permit schema, which has required a 
                                              
9
 Contrary to the Dissent’s suggestion, requiring 
demonstration of a “justifiable need” prior to issuance of a 
permit to carry openly or concealed does not amount to “a 
complete prohibition on public carry.” Dissenting Opinion 19. 
Although the Dissent eventually acknowledges that New 
Jersey is merely regulating public carry, see id. at 24, it takes 
pains to refer to New Jersey’s approach as a “prohibition,” 
referring to New Jersey’s schema as “a prohibition against 
both open and concealed carry without a permit  . . . .” Id. at 
21 (emphasis added). This obfuscates what New Jersey is 
actually doing. It is regulating public carry by imposing an 
objective standard for issuance of a public carry permit, and 
its regulation is a longstanding, presumptively constitutional 
one. 
17 
 
showing of need, or “proper cause,” for a century. In 1913 
New York determined that a reasonable method for 
addressing the dangers inherent in the carrying of handguns in 
public was to limit handgun possession in public to those 
showing “proper cause” for the issuance of a permit. 
Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 85 (citing 1913 Laws of N.Y., ch. 
608, at 1627-1630). In combination with New York’s ban on 
open carrying, typical New Yorkers desiring to carry a 
handgun in public must demonstrate “proper cause,” just as 
typical New Jerseyans must demonstrate “justifiable need.”10 
As the District Court noted, New York’s statute was “adopted 
in the same era that states began adopting the felon in 
possession statutes that Heller explicitly recognized as being 
presumptively lawful longstanding regulations.” District 
Court Opinion 32. The D.C. Circuit in Heller v. District of 
Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011) [Heller II], 
stated that the Supreme Court “considered ‘prohibitions on 
the possession of firearms by felons’ to be ‘longstanding’ 
although states did not start to enact them until the early 20th 
century.” Simply put, we need not find that New Jersey and 
other states, at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, 
required a particularized showing of objective justification to 
carry a handgun.
11
 Accordingly, New York’s adoption of a 
                                              
10
 Here, we use the phrase “typical” to refer to persons in 
New York and New Jersey who do not fall into any of the 
statutorily specified categories of persons who may carry a 
firearm in public without demonstrating “proper cause” or 
“justifiable need,” respectively. Accordingly, the individual 
plaintiffs in this case are “typical,” as they do not fall into any 
of those specified categories. 
11
 In Barton, 633 F.3d at 173, we explained that the “first 
federal statute disqualifying felons from possessing firearms 
18 
 
“proper cause” standard in 1913, 11 years before New Jersey 
required that permits be issued only upon a showing of 
“need,” supports our conclusion that New Jersey’s “justifiable 
need” standard may be upheld as a longstanding regulation.12 
                                                                                                     
was enacted in 1938,” adding that “Congress did not bar non-
violent felons from possessing guns until 1961.” Our sister 
courts have likewise recognized that a firearms regulation 
may be “longstanding” and “presumptively lawful” even if it 
was only first enacted in the 20th century. See National Rifle 
Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 196-97 (5th Cir. 
2012) (upholding as a “longstanding” provision a federal 
statute prohibiting transfer of firearms from federal licensees 
to individuals under age 21, which Congress did not adopt 
until 1968); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640-41 
(7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), which 
forbids firearm possession by a person who has been 
adjudicated to be mentally ill, was enacted in 1968). “After 
all, Heller considered firearm possession bans on felons and 
the mentally ill to be longstanding, yet the current versions of 
these bans are of mid–20th century vintage.” National Rifle 
Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 196. 
12
 The Dissent suggests that the longstanding nature of New 
York’s “proper cause” standard cannot support our 
conclusion that the “justifiable need” standard qualifies as a 
longstanding regulation. It states that the “Second Circuit . . . 
upheld New York’s law because it survived intermediate 
scrutiny, not because it evaded Second Amendment 
cognizance on account of its longstandingness.” Dissenting 
Opinion 26. We agree that this is what the Kachalsky court 
did, but disagree that its decision to resolve the case solely 
through intermediate scrutiny requires that we do the same 
19 
 
We discern no hint in the Second Amendment 
jurisprudence of either the Supreme Court or this Court that 
the analysis of a particular regulation in a particular 
jurisdiction should turn entirely on the historical experience 
of that jurisdiction alone. To the contrary, in Barton, our 
analysis of the constitutionality of a federal firearm restriction 
included consideration of the fact that at least seven state 
legislatures “had adopted bans on the carrying of concealed 
weapons by violent offenders” prior to 1923. 633 F.3d at 173. 
 
Consequently, assuming that the Second Amendment 
confers upon individuals some right to carry arms outside the 
home, we would nevertheless conclude that the “justifiable 
need” standard of the Handgun Permit Law is a longstanding 
regulation that enjoys presumptive constitutionality under the 
teachings articulated in Heller and expanded upon in our 
Court’s precedent. Accordingly, it regulates conduct falling 
outside the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee. 
 
VI. 
 
As discussed above, we believe that the “justifiable 
need” standard of the Handgun Permit Law qualifies as a 
“longstanding,” “presumptively lawful” regulation that 
regulates conduct falling outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment’s guarantee. Consequently, we need not move to 
the second step of Marzzarella to apply means-end scrutiny, 
but we have decided to do so because the constitutional issues 
presented to us in this new era of Second Amendment 
jurisprudence are of critical importance. Even assuming that 
                                                                                                     
here. We cite to Kachalsky here merely for its description of 
New York’s law and standard.  
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the “justifiable need” standard is not a longstanding 
regulation enjoying presumptive constitutionality, at the 
second step of Marzzarella it withstands the appropriate, 
intermediate level of scrutiny, and accordingly we would 
uphold the continued use of the standard on this basis as well. 
 
A. 
 
As a preliminary matter, we reject Appellants’ 
invitation to apply First Amendment prior restraint doctrine 
rather than traditional means-end scrutiny. Appellants 
contend that we should apply the First Amendment prior 
restraint doctrine because application of the Handgun Permit 
Law’s “justifiable need” standard vests licensing officials 
with “unbridled discretion.” Appellants correctly note that 
this Court has stated that “the structure of First Amendment 
doctrine should inform our analysis of the Second 
Amendment.” See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89 n.4. This 
statement, however, reflects this Court’s willingness to 
consider the varying levels of means-end scrutiny applied to 
First Amendment challenges when determining what level of 
scrutiny to apply to a Second Amendment challenge. It does 
not compel us to import the prior restraint doctrine. Indeed, 
this Court has rejected a similar invitation to import the First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine to the Second Amendment 
context. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 172 n.3. 
 
Even if we were to apply the prior restraint doctrine, it 
would not compel the result sought by Appellants because 
New Jersey’s Handgun Permit Law does not vest licensing 
officials with “unbridled discretion.” Appellants incorrectly 
characterize the “justifiable need” standard as a highly 
discretionary, seat-of-the-pants determination. On the 
21 
 
contrary, the standards to be applied by licensing officials are 
clear and specific, as they are codified in New Jersey’s 
administrative code and have been explained and applied in 
numerous New Jersey court opinions. Moreover, they are 
accompanied by specific procedures
13
 that provide 
“safeguards against arbitrary official action.” See Siccardi, 
284 A.2d at 539. Accordingly, we conclude that even if we 
were to apply the prior restraint doctrine, the Handgun Permit 
Law would survive its application. 
 
B. 
 
Having determined that it would not be appropriate to 
import First Amendment prior restraint doctrine to our 
analysis of Appellants’ Second Amendment challenge here, 
we conclude that the appropriate level of traditional means-
end scrutiny to apply would be intermediate scrutiny.  
 
As laws burdening protected conduct under the First 
Amendment are susceptible to different levels of scrutiny, 
similarly “the Second Amendment can trigger more than one 
particular standard of scrutiny, depending, at least in part, 
upon the type of law challenged and the type of Second 
Amendment restriction at issue.” United States v. Reese, 627 
F.3d 792, 801 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 
at 96-97) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).  
                                              
13
 See N.J.S.A. § 2C:58-4(e) (allowing an applicant whose 
application is denied by the  chief police officer or 
superintendent to “request a hearing in the Superior Court . . . 
by filing a written request for such a hearing within 30 days 
of the denial”). 
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Three levels of scrutiny are potentially available: 
rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict 
scrutiny. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 95-99. Under rational basis 
review, we would “presume[] the law is valid and ask[] only 
whether the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest,” id. at 95-96 n.13 (citing City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)), but Heller 
makes clear that we may not apply rational basis review to a 
law that burdens protected Second Amendment conduct, id. at 
95-96 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27). At the other end 
of the spectrum is strict scrutiny, which demands that the 
statute be “narrowly tailored to promote a compelling 
Government interest . . . [;] [i]f a less restrictive alternative 
would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must 
use that alternative.” United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (internal citations omitted). In 
between is intermediate scrutiny, under which the 
government’s asserted interest must be more than just 
legitimate but need not be compelling. It must be “significant, 
substantial, or important.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Additionally, 
“the fit” between the asserted interest and the challenged law 
need not be “perfect,” but it must be “reasonable”14 and “may 
not burden more [conduct] than is reasonably necessary.” Id. 
                                              
14
 Marzzarella has articulated for this Court that Second 
Amendment intermediate scrutiny requires a fit that is 
“reasonable.” See 614 F.3d at 98. We note that the Fourth 
Circuit also requires a “reasonable” fit, although the Second 
Circuit requires a “substantial” fit. Compare Woollard v. 
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that the fit 
must be “reasonable,” but need not be perfect), with 
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In Marzzarella, this Court applied intermediate 
scrutiny to evaluate the constitutionality of a federal law 
prohibiting possession of firearms with obliterated serial 
numbers. 614 F.3d at 97. Appellants contend that Marzzarella 
should not inform our analysis of the appropriate level of 
scrutiny to apply here because the law at issue in Marzzarella 
“d[id] not severely limit the possession of firearms.” See id. 
They contend that only strict scrutiny could possibly apply to 
the case at bar because the burden imposed by the “justifiable 
need” standard “is substantial, implicating the core rights of 
responsible, law-abiding citizens to engage in an activity 
whose protection is literally enumerated.” Appellants’ Brief 
52. We disagree. 
 
In the First Amendment context, strict scrutiny is 
triggered when the government imposes content-based 
restrictions on speech in a public forum. See Pleasant Grove 
City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009). In essence, this 
is the core of the First Amendment, just like the core of the 
right conferred upon individuals by the Second Amendment 
is the right to possess usable handguns in the home for self-
defense. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93 (“[W]e believe that 
applying less than strict scrutiny when the regulation does not 
burden the ‘core’ protection of self-defense in the home 
makes eminent sense in this context and is in line with the 
approach taken by our sister circuits.”). We agree with the 
District Court, therefore, that strict scrutiny should not apply 
here, because “[i]f the Second Amendment protects the right 
to carry a handgun outside the home for self-defense at all, 
                                                                                                     
Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97 (stating that the fit must be 
“substantial” but citing Marzzarella for the standard).  
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that right is not part of the core of the Amendment.” District 
Court Opinion 39. Accordingly, we will apply intermediate 
scrutiny here. 
 
C. 
 
As stated above, under intermediate scrutiny the 
government must assert a significant, substantial, or important 
interest; there must also be a reasonable fit between that 
asserted interest and the challenged law, such that the law 
does not burden more conduct than is reasonably necessary. 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98. When reviewing the 
constitutionality of statutes, courts “accord substantial 
deference to the [legislature’s] predictive judgments.” See 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997). 
 
D. 
 
 The State of New Jersey has, undoubtedly, a 
significant, substantial and important interest in protecting its 
citizens’ safety. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 
745 (1987).
15
 The issue here, therefore, is whether there is a 
“reasonable fit” between this interest in safety and the means 
chosen by New Jersey to achieve it: the Handgun Permit Law 
and its “justifiable need” standard.16 
 
                                              
15
 Appellants do not dispute this point. 
16
 The Dissent repeatedly states that we do not consider the 
“justifiable need requirement itself” but rather “examin[e] the 
permitting requirement as a whole.” See, e.g., Dissenting 
Opinion 29, 36. This is a mischaracterization, to which we 
respond, res ipsa loquitur.  
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1. 
 
The predictive judgment of New Jersey’s legislators is 
that limiting the issuance of permits to carry a handgun in 
public to only those who can show a “justifiable need” will 
further its substantial interest in public safety.
17
 New Jersey 
contends that the “justifiable need” standard “precisely fits 
New Jersey’s interest in assessing the corresponding dangers 
and risk to the public and to the person seeking to carry a 
handgun. The [standard] provides a means to determine 
whether the increase in risk and danger borne by the public is 
justified by a demonstrated risk and danger borne to the 
person seeking to carry a handgun.” Appellees’ Brief 34. To 
be sure, New Jersey has not presented us with much evidence 
to show how or why its legislators arrived at this predictive 
judgment. New Jersey’s counsel acknowledges that “there is 
no available commentary which would clarify whether or not 
the Legislature considered statistical information to support 
                                              
17
 New Jersey has asserted that the interests served by the 
Handgun Permit Law and its “justifiable need” standard 
include “combating handgun violence,” “combating the 
dangers and risks associated with the misuse and accidental 
use of handguns,” and “reduc[ing] the use of handguns in 
crimes.” Appellees’ Brief 34. All of these interests fall under 
the substantial government interest in “ensur[ing] the safety 
of all of its citizenry.” Id. The Dissent improperly narrows the 
“fit” inquiry to consider only one asserted interest, writing: 
“we must ask whether the State has justified its conclusion 
that those with a special need for self-defense are less likely 
to misuse or accidently use a handgun than those who do not 
have a special need.” Dissenting Opinion 29.  
 
26 
 
the public safety purpose of the State’s Carry Permit Law.” 
Appellees’ February 27, 2013 Letter at 1-2. 
 
New Jersey’s inability to muster legislative history 
indicating what reports, statistical information, and other 
studies its legislature pondered when it concluded that 
requiring handgun permit applicants to demonstrate a 
“justifiable need” would reasonably further its substantial 
public safety interest, notwithstanding the potential burden on 
Second Amendment rights, is unsurprising. First, at each 
relevant moment in the history of New Jersey gun laws, 
spanning from 1905
18
 to 1981,
19
 the legislature could not have 
foreseen that restrictions on carrying a firearm outside the 
home could run afoul of a Second Amendment that had not 
yet been held to protect an individual right to bear arms, 
given that the teachings of Heller were not available until that 
landmark case was decided in 2008. Moreover, Second 
Amendment protections were not incorporated against the 
states until 2010, when the Supreme Court issued its 
splintered opinion in McDonald. Simply put, New Jersey’s 
legislators could not have known that they were potentially 
burdening protected Second Amendment conduct, and as 
                                              
18
 See Compiled Statutes of New Jersey, Vol. II., 1759 
(Soney & Sage 1911) (reprinting 1905 statute stating “[a]ny 
person who shall carry any revolver, pistol, firearm, 
bludgeon, blackjack, knuckles, sand-bag, slung-shot or other 
deadly, offensive or dangerous weapon, or any stiletto, dagger 
or razor or any knife with a blade five inches in length or over 
concealed in or about his clothes or person, shall be guilty of 
a misdemeanor”). 
19
 New Jersey’s permit schema as it stands today was last 
amended in 1981.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4. 
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such we refuse to hold that the fit here is not reasonable 
merely because New Jersey cannot identify a study or tables 
of crime statistics upon which it based its predictive 
judgment. As the District Court correctly concluded, New 
Jersey’s legislature “has continually made the reasonable 
inference that given the obviously dangerous and deadly 
nature of handguns, requiring a showing of particularized 
need for a permit to carry one publicly serves the State’s 
interests in public safety.” District Court Opinion 42. To 
require applicants to demonstrate a “justifiable need” is a 
reasonable implementation of New Jersey’s substantial, 
indeed critical, interest in public safety. See IMS Health, Inc. 
v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining that 
under intermediate scrutiny states are “allowed to justify 
speech restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes,” 
and also by reference to “history, consensus, and simple 
common sense”) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
abrogated on other grounds by 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 
2. 
 
Legislators in other states, including New York and 
Maryland, have reached this same predictive judgment and 
have enacted similar laws as a means to improve public 
safety. As mentioned above, in 1913 New York enacted a law 
requiring applicants to demonstrate “proper cause—a special 
need for self-protection.” Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 84. 
Maryland law allows issuance of a permit to carry a handgun 
in public only upon a finding that an applicant “has good and 
substantial reason to wear, carry, or transport a handgun, such 
as a finding that the permit is necessary as a reasonable 
precaution against apprehended danger.” Woollard v. 
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Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Md. Code 
Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-306(a)(5)(ii)). 
 
In Siccardi, the Supreme Court of New Jersey quoted 
from a staff report to the National Commission on the Causes 
and Prevention of Violence by Newton and Zimring, who: 
evaluated the utility of firearms as weapons of 
defense against crime. They found that private 
possession of a handgun is rarely an effective 
means of self-protection; and so far as the 
carrying of handguns is concerned, they noted 
that “no data exist which would establish the 
value of firearms as a defense against attack on 
the street” though “there is evidence that the 
ready accessibility of guns contributes 
significantly to the number of unpremeditated 
homicides and to the seriousness of many 
assaults.”  
Siccardi, 284 A.2d at 537 (citing Newton and Zimring, 
Firearms and Violence in American Life, p. 67 (1968)).  
 
Although we lack an explicit statement by New 
Jersey’s legislature explaining why it adopted the “justifiable 
need” standard, its 1978 decision to change “need” to 
“justifiable need” suggests that the legislature agreed with 
Siccardi’s reasoning and ultimate conclusion. See Siccardi, 
284 A.2d at 535 (approving denial of a permit for failure to 
“justify a need for carrying a weapon”) (emphasis added). As 
discussed above in Section I, the executive branch similarly 
indicated its approval of Siccardi when it defined “justifiable 
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need” in the Administrative Code by closely tracking the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey’s language. See id. at 540. 
 
3. 
 
We must emphasize that the fit between the challenged 
law and the interest in public safety need only be 
“reasonable.” As New Jersey correctly notes, the Handgun 
Permit Law and its “justifiable need” standard provide “a 
means to determine whether the increase in risk and danger 
borne by the public is justified by a demonstrated risk and 
danger borne to the person seeking to carry a handgun.” 
Appellees’ Brief 34. By contrast, Appellants contend that 
enabling qualified, responsible, law abiding people to defend 
themselves from crime by carrying a handgun, regardless of 
their ability to show a “justifiable need,” serves the interest of 
public safety. New Jersey legislators, however, have made a 
policy judgment that the state can best protect public safety 
by allowing only those qualified individuals who can 
demonstrate a “justifiable need” to carry a handgun to do so. 
In essence, New Jersey’s schema takes into account the 
individual’s right to protect himself from violence as well as 
the community at large’s interest in self-protection. It is New 
Jersey’s judgment that when an individual carries a handgun 
in public for his or her own defense, he or she necessarily 
exposes members of the community to a somewhat 
heightened risk that they will be injured by that handgun. 
New Jersey has decided that this somewhat heightened risk to 
the public may be outweighed by the potential safety benefit 
to an individual with a “justifiable need” to carry a handgun. 
Furthermore, New Jersey has decided that it can best 
determine when the individual benefit outweighs the 
30 
 
increased risk to the community through careful case-by-case 
scrutiny of each application, by the police and a court.
20
   
 
Other states have determined that it is unnecessary to 
conduct the careful, case-by-case scrutiny mandated by New 
Jersey’s gun laws before issuing a permit to publicly carry a 
handgun. Even accepting that there may be conflicting 
empirical evidence as to the relationship between public 
handgun carrying and public safety, this does not suggest, let 
alone compel, a conclusion that the “fit” between New 
Jersey’s individualized, tailored approach and public safety is 
not “reasonable.”  
 
4. 
                                              
20
 As the Supreme Court of New Jersey has explained: 
 
So concerned is the [New Jersey] Legislature 
about this licensing process that it allows only a 
Superior Court judge to issue a permit, after 
applicants first obtain approval from their local 
chief of police. In this (as perhaps in the case of 
election laws) the Legislature has reposed what 
is essentially an executive function in the 
judicial branch. We have acceded to that 
legislative delegation because “[t]he New 
Jersey Legislature has long been aware of the 
dangers inherent in the carrying of handguns 
and the urgent necessity of their 
regulation . . . .” 
 
In re Preis, 573 A.2d at 151 (quoting Siccardi, 284 A.2d at 
538). 
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As to the requirement that the “justifiable need” 
standard not burden more conduct than is reasonably 
necessary, we agree with the District Court that the standard 
meets this requirement. “Unlike strict scrutiny review, we are 
not required to ensure that the legislature’s chosen means is 
‘narrowly tailored’ or the least restrictive available means to 
serve the stated governmental interest.” Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 
at 97. New Jersey engages in an individualized consideration 
of each person’s circumstances and his or her objective, 
rather than subjective, need to carry a handgun in public. This 
measured approach neither bans public handgun carrying nor 
allows public carrying by all firearm owners; instead, the 
New Jersey Legislature left room for public carrying by those 
citizens who can demonstrate a “justifiable need” to do so.21 
We refuse Appellants’ invitation to intrude upon the sound 
judgment and discretion of the State of New Jersey, and we 
conclude that the “justifiable need” standard withstands 
intermediate scrutiny.  
 
                                              
21
 Although the Dissent acknowledges that the “fit” required 
need only be “reasonable,” in application the Dissent 
repeatedly demands much more of the “justifiable need” 
provision than a reasonable fit. For example, the Dissent 
suggests that New Jersey has failed to show “that the 
justifiable need requirement is the provision that can best 
determine whether the individual right to keep and bear arms 
‘outweighs’ the increased risk to the community that its 
members will be injured by handguns.” Dissenting Opinion 
38 (emphasis added).  Of course, this far overstates what must 
be shown in order for a challenged regulation to survive 
intermediate scrutiny. 
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VII. 
 
 We conclude that the District Court correctly 
determined that the requirement that applicants demonstrate a 
“justifiable need” to publicly carry a handgun for self-defense 
qualifies as a “presumptively lawful,” “longstanding” 
regulation and therefore does not burden conduct within the 
scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee. We conclude 
also that the District Court correctly determined that even if 
the “justifiable need” standard fails to qualify as such a 
regulation, it nonetheless withstands intermediate scrutiny 
and is therefore constitutional. Accordingly, we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court. 
  
Drake v. Filko, No. 12-1150 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”  In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
(2008), the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment 
protects an individual right to keep and bear arms for 
purposes of self-defense.  Two years later, the Court applied 
the Second Amendment to the States in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).  Because I am convinced 
that New Jersey’s law conditioning the issuance of a permit to 
carry a handgun in public on a showing of “justifiable need” 
contravenes the Second Amendment, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
As befits a diverse nation of fifty sovereign States and 
countless municipalities, gun regulation in the United States 
resembles a patchwork quilt that largely reflects local custom.  
Regarding the public carry of firearms, two dichotomies are 
relevant to this case.  First, in many States, laws distinguish 
between open carry of a handgun—such as in a visibly 
exposed belt holster—and concealed carry—such as hidden 
from view under clothing or in a pocket.  Thirty-one States 
currently allow open carry of a handgun without a permit, 
twelve States (including New Jersey) allow open carry with a 
permit,
1
 and seven States prohibit open carry entirely.
2
  By 
                                                 
1
 See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-35; Ga. Code Ann. § 16-
11-126(h); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134-9(c); Iowa Code Ann. 
§ 724.4(1), (4)(i); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4-
 2 
 
contrast, four States and parts of Montana allow concealed 
carry without a permit
3
 and forty-four States allow concealed 
carry with a permit.
4
  One State, Illinois, prohibited public 
                                                                                                             
203(a)(1)(i), (b)(2); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 10(a)(2); 
Minn. Stat. § 624.714(1a); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-5(b); Okla. 
Stat. tit. 21, §§ 1289.6, 1290.5(A); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-
1351; Utah Code Ann. §§ 53-5-704(1)(c), 76-10-505(1)(b).  
In California, open carry of a loaded handgun is permitted 
with a license in rural counties, but prohibited elsewhere.  See 
Cal. Penal Code §§ 25850, 26150(b)(2).   
 
2
 See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-73-120, 5-73-315; Fla. Stat. 
§ 790.053(1); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-1; N.Y. Penal Law 
§§ 265.03(3), 400.00(2)(f); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-47-8(a), 11-
47-11(a); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-23-20(12), 23-31-215; Tex. 
Penal Code Ann. § 46.035(a).   
 
3
 If one can lawfully possess a handgun, one can 
lawfully carry it concealed without a permit in Alaska, 
Arizona, Vermont, and Wyoming.  Nicholas J. Johnson et al., 
Firearms Law and the Second Amendment 21 (2012).  
Although Montana requires a permit for concealed carrying 
of a handgun in cities and towns, concealed carrying of a 
handgun without a permit is allowed for “a person who is 
outside the official boundaries of a city or town or the 
confines of a logging, lumbering, mining, or railroad camp.”  
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-317(1)(i); see id. §§ 45-8-316(1), 
45-8-321. 
 
4
 See Ala. Code §§ 13A-11-50, 13A-11-73; Ark. Code 
Ann. § 5-73-315(a); Cal. Penal Code § 26150; Colo. Rev. 
Stat. § 18-12-105(2)(c); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-35(a); Del. 
 3 
 
carry of handguns altogether, but that law was struck down as 
violative of the Second Amendment by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in December 2012.  
See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).   
The second relevant dichotomy is between “shall-
issue” and “may-issue” permitting regimes.  In the forty shall-
                                                                                                             
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1442; Fla. Stat. § 790.06; Ga. Code Ann. 
§ 16-11-126; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134-9; Idaho Code Ann. § 18-
3302(7); Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1(a); Iowa Code § 724.4(4)(i); 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6302(d)(8); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 527.020(4); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1379.3; Me. Rev. Stat. 
tit. 25, § 2001-A; Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4-203(b)(2); 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 10(a)(2); Mich. Comp. Laws 
§ 750.227(2); Minn. Stat. § 624.714(1a); Miss. Code Ann. 
§§ 45-9-101, 97-37-1(1); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030(1), (4); 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1202(1)(a), (2); Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 202.350(1)(d)(3), 202.3657; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 159:4; 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-5(b); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-7-2(A)(5); 
N.Y. Penal Law §§ 265.03(3), 400.00(2)(f); N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 14-269(a1)(2); N.D. Cent. Code § 62.1-04-02; Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. § 2923.12; Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §§ 1290.4, 1290.5; 
Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.250(1)(a), 166.260(1)(h); 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 6106(a)(1); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-8(a); S.C. 
Code Ann. § 16-23-460(B)(1); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-14-9; 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351; Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. 
§ 411.171 et seq.; Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504; Va. Code 
Ann. § 18.2-308; Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.050(1)(a); W. Va. 
Code § 61-7-3; Wis. Stat. § 941.23(2)(d).   
 
 4 
 
issue States,
5
 permitting officials must grant an application 
for handgun carry permits so long as the applicant satisfies 
certain objective criteria, such as a background check and 
completion of a safety course.  See Nicholas J. Johnson et al., 
Firearms Law and the Second Amendment 21 (2012).  In 
                                                 
5
 See Alaska Stat. § 18.65.700; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-
309; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3112; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-
203(1); Fla. Stat. § 790.06(2); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-129; 
Idaho Code Ann. § 18-3302(1); Ind. Code § 35-47-2-3; Iowa 
Code § 724.7(1); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-7c03; Ky. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 237.110(4); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1379.3(A)(1); 
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 25, § 2003(1); Mich. Comp. Laws 
§ 28.425b(7); Minn. Stat. § 624.714(2)(b); Miss. Code Ann. 
§ 45-9-101(6)(c); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.101(1); Mont. Code 
Ann. § 45-8-321(1); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 69-2430(3)(b), 69-
2433; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.3657(3); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 159:6(I)(a); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-19-4(A); N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 14-415.12; N.D. Cent. Code §§ 62.1-04-03(1); Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. § 2923.125(D); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1290.12(12); 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.291; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6109(e)(1); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-31-215(A)-(C); S.D. 
Codified Laws § 23-7-7; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351; 
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 411.172; Utah Code Ann. § 53-5-
704; Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-308.02; Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 9.41.070; W. Va. Code § 61-7-4; Wis. Stat. § 175.60; Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-8-104(b).  In addition, Alabama and 
Connecticut “by statute allow considerable police discretion 
but, in practice, commonly issue permits to applicants who 
meet the same standards as in shall-issue states.”  Johnson, 
supra, at 21; see also Ala. Code § 13A-11-75; Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 29-28(a).   
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these jurisdictions, a general desire for self-defense is 
sufficient to obtain a handgun.   
Eight States, including New Jersey, have may-issue 
permitting regimes.
6
  See id.  In these States, local authorities 
have more discretion to decide who may be granted 
permission to carry a handgun, and the general desire to 
defend one’s self or property is insufficient for the permit to 
issue.  Instead, an applicant must demonstrate “justifiable 
need,”7 “proper cause,”8 or “good and substantial reason”9 to 
carry a handgun.  Although these standards are phrased 
differently, they are essentially the same—the applicant must 
show a special need for self-defense distinguishable from that 
of the population at large, often through a specific and 
particularized threat of harm.  See Maj. Typescript at 5 & n.2 
(discussing New Jersey law); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 
F.3d 865, 869–70 (4th Cir. 2013) (discussing Maryland law); 
                                                 
6
 See Cal. Penal Code § 26150; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
§ 1441; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134-9(a); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
140, § 131(d); Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-306; N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:58-4(c); N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(2)(f); R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 11-47-11(a).   
 
7
 E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4(c).   
 
8
 E.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(2)(f).   
 
9
 E.g., Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5–306(a)(5)(ii).   
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Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 86–87 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (discussing New York law).
10
   
The relative merits of shall-issue regimes versus may-
issue regimes are debatable and it is not the role of the federal 
courts to determine the wisdom of either.  And but for the 
doctrine of incorporation, the States would be free to choose 
whatever policy they desired without federal intervention.  
Since McDonald, however, we find ourselves in a situation 
akin to that in which the federal courts found themselves after 
the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule applied to 
the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  Prior to that 
decision, many States did not require the exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence in recognition of the “grave 
adverse consequence that exclusion of relevant incriminating 
evidence always entails (viz., the risk of releasing dangerous 
criminals into society).”  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 
595 (2006); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 
224–25 (1960) (in the year before Mapp, twenty-two States 
had a full exclusionary rule, four States had a partial 
exclusionary rule, and twenty-four States had no exclusionary 
rule).   
As it did with the exclusionary rule, the Supreme 
Court has applied the Second Amendment to the States, 
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026, and “the enshrinement of 
constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices 
off the table,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.  So the question 
                                                 
10
 Of the remaining two states—Vermont and 
Illinois—Vermont issues no permits to carry weapons and 
public carry is allowed, whereas Illinois prohibited public 
carry altogether.   
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presented is not whether New Jersey’s justifiable need 
requirement is a reasonable, let alone a wise, policy choice.  
Rather, we must decide whether the New Jersey statute 
violates the Second Amendment.   
II 
With few exceptions, New Jersey law prohibits 
handgun possession in public without a permit.  See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:39-5(b).  In addition to meeting certain age, 
criminal history, and mental health requirements, an 
individual seeking a permit must complete a training course, 
pass a test of the State’s laws governing the use of force, 
provide qualification scores from test firings administered by 
a certified instructor, and demonstrate a “justifiable need” to 
carry a handgun.  See id. § 2C:58-4(c); N.J. Admin. Code 
§ 13:54-2.4.  “Justifiable need” is defined as: 
the urgent necessity for self-protection, as 
evidenced by specific threats or previous attacks 
which demonstrate a special danger to the 
applicant’s life that cannot be avoided by means 
other than by issuance of a permit to carry a 
handgun. 
N.J. Admin. Code § 13:54-2.4(d)(1).  “Generalized fears for 
personal safety are inadequate, and a need to protect property 
alone does not suffice.”  In re Preis, 573 A.2d 148, 152 (N.J. 
1990). 
An application for a handgun carry permit is first made 
to a police official, who determines whether the applicant 
meets the statutory requirements.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-
4(c).  Upon approval, the police present the application to a 
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Superior Court judge for independent review of whether the 
statutory requirements, including “justifiable need,” have 
been met.  Id. § 2C:58-4(d).  The Superior Court judge may 
issue an unrestricted permit, issue a limited-type permit that 
restricts the types of handguns the applicant may carry and 
where or for what purposes such handguns may be carried, or 
deny the application.  Id.  If the Superior Court denies an 
application, the applicant may appeal the decision, id. 
§ 2C:58-4(e), but appellate review is highly deferential, see In 
re Pantano, 60 A.3d 507, 510 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2013).   
Appellants brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 
challenge New Jersey’s justifiable need requirement, arguing 
that it is incompatible with the Second Amendment.  Each of 
the individual appellants—a group which included a reserve 
sheriff’s deputy, a civilian FBI employee, an owner of a 
business that restocks ATM machines and carries large 
amounts of cash, and a victim of an interstate kidnapping—
applied for a handgun carry permit, but were denied for want 
of justifiable need.
11
   
The District Court rejected their challenge in a series 
of alternative holdings.  Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 
813 (D.N.J. 2012).  First, it ruled that the Second Amendment 
does not protect a general right to carry a gun for self-defense 
outside the home.  See id. at 820–29.  Second, the Court 
concluded that even if the law “implicate[d] some narrow 
right to carry a firearm outside the home,” the law is a 
                                                 
11
 During the pendency of this litigation, two of the 
original plaintiffs were granted permits, and thus their cases 
became moot.   
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“longstanding” regulation that is presumptively 
constitutional.  See id. at 829–31.  Finally, it determined that 
even if the Second Amendment extended outside the home 
and the law was not longstanding enough to be presumptively 
constitutional, it would still survive intermediate scrutiny.  
See id. at 831–37.   
III 
Pursuant to the first prong of the test we established in 
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010), 
we must determine whether New Jersey’s justifiable need 
requirement burdens conduct protected by the Second 
Amendment.  New Jersey argues—and the District Court 
held—that the justifiable need requirement does not burden 
conduct protected by the Second Amendment because that 
right has no application beyond the confines of one’s home.  
This view is based on an incorrect reading of Heller and 
McDonald, both of which indicate that the Second 
Amendment extends beyond the home.   
First, Heller engaged in significant historical analysis 
on the meaning of the text of the Second Amendment, 
specifically focusing on the words “keep” and “bear” as 
codifying distinct rights.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 582–84.  
The Court defined “keep arms” as to “have weapons,” id. at 
582, and to “bear arms” as to “wear, bear, or carry upon the 
person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose of 
being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a 
case of conflict with another person,” id. at 584 (citation and 
alterations omitted).  To speak of “bearing” arms solely 
within one’s home not only would conflate “bearing” with 
“keeping,” in derogation of the Court’s holding that the verbs 
codified distinct rights, but also would be awkward usage 
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given the meaning assigned the terms by the Supreme Court.  
See Moore, 702 F.3d at 936 (“The right to ‘bear’ as distinct 
from the right to ‘keep’ arms is unlikely to refer to the home.  
To speak of ‘bearing’ arms within one’s home would at all 
times have been an awkward usage.  A right to bear arms thus 
implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the home.”).   
In addition, the Heller Court repeatedly noted that the 
Second Amendment protects an inherent right to self-defense, 
see 554 U.S. at 599 (“self-defense . . . was the central 
component of the right itself” (emphasis in original)); id. at 
628 (“[T]he inherent right of self-defense has been central to 
the Second Amendment right.”), and consistently employed 
language referring to a more general right to self-defense than 
one confined to the home.  For example, the Court described 
the Amendment’s operative clause—“to keep and bear 
arms”—as “guarantee[ing] the individual right to possess and 
carry weapons in case of confrontation.”  Id. at 592.  The 
Court also defined “bear arms” to include being “armed and 
ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict 
with another person.”  Id. at 584.  Obviously, confrontations 
and conflicts “are not limited to the home.”  Moore, 702 F.3d 
at 936.   
Moreover, while the Court noted that “the need for 
defense of self, family, and property is most acute” in the 
home, Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (emphasis added), “that 
doesn’t mean it is not acute outside the home,” Moore, 702 
F.3d at 935.  Instead, it “suggest[s] that some form of the 
right applies where that need is not ‘most acute.’”  United 
States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(Niemeyer, J., concurring).  Were it otherwise, there would be 
no need for the modifier “most.”  This reasoning is consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s historical understanding of the right 
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to keep and bear arms as “an individual right protecting 
against both public and private violence,” such as in cases of 
armed resistance against oppression by the Crown.  Heller, 
554 U.S. at 594; see also id. at 592–95.   
Furthermore, Heller also recognized that the right to 
bear arms was understood at the founding to “exist not only 
for self-defense, but also for membership in a militia and for 
hunting, neither of which is a home-bound activity.”  
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 468 (Niemeyer, J., concurring) 
(citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 598–99).  Likewise, when the 
Court acknowledged that the Second Amendment right was 
not unlimited, it listed as presumptively lawful regulations 
those “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 
places such as schools and government buildings.”  Heller, 
554 U.S. at 626 (emphasis added).  “If the Second 
Amendment right were confined to self-defense in the home, 
the Court would not have needed to express a reservation for 
‘sensitive places’ outside of the home.”  Masciandaro, 638 
F.3d at 468 (Niemeyer, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).   
Most importantly, the McDonald Court described the 
holding in Heller as encompassing a general right to self-
defense.  The very first sentence of McDonald states: “Two 
years ago, in District of Columbia v. Heller, we held that the 
Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms 
for the purpose of self-defense, and we struck down a District 
of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in 
the home.”  McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026 (citation omitted).  
Describing the holding this way—first establishing the legal 
principle embodied in the Second Amendment and then 
explaining how it was applied—demonstrates that the legal 
principle enunciated in Heller is not confined to the facts 
presented in that case.   
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Advocates of a home-bound Second Amendment, 
including New Jersey and the District Court, argue that 
Heller’s recognition of an individual Second Amendment 
right of self-defense was inextricably tied to the home.  See 
Appellee Br. 15–16; Piszczatoski, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 821–22.  
They cite statements in Heller such as the directive that the 
District of Columbia must allow Heller “to register his 
handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home.”  
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (emphasis added).  Also, they note 
that Heller purposely left unclear the entire universe of 
Second Amendment law: “And whatever else [the Second 
Amendment] leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates 
above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible 
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  Finally, they cite Heller’s statement that 
the Second Amendment is “not a right to keep and carry any 
weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for 
whatever purpose.”  Id. at 626.   
These arguments prove too much.  In making these 
comments regarding the home, the Court was merely 
applying the Second Amendment to the facts at issue in the 
case before it.  Heller challenged the District of Columbia’s 
prohibition on guns in the home, not its prohibitions on public 
carry.  The application of the law to the facts does not vitiate 
the Court’s articulation of the right to keep and bear arms as a 
general right of self-defense.   
Although the majority declines to determine whether 
the Second Amendment extends outside the home, see Maj. 
Typescript at 12, my view that the Second Amendment 
extends outside of the home is hardly novel.  Indeed, the only 
court of appeals to squarely address the issue has so held.  See 
Moore, 702 F.3d at 942 (“The Supreme Court has decided 
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that the amendment confers a right to bear arms for self-
defense, which is as important outside the home as inside.”).  
In addition, we and other courts of appeals have 
acknowledged in dicta that the Second Amendment applies 
beyond the home.  See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 92 (“At its 
core, the Second Amendment protects the right of law-
abiding citizens to possess non-dangerous weapons for self-
defense in the home.  And certainly, to some degree, it must 
protect the right of law-abiding citizens to possess firearms 
for other, as-yet-undefined, lawful purposes.” (internal 
citations and footnote omitted)); see also Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 
at 89 (“Although the Supreme Court’s cases applying the 
Second Amendment have arisen only in connection with 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms in the home, the 
Court’s analysis suggests . . . that the Amendment must have 
some application in the very different context of the public 
possession of firearms.” (emphasis in original)); 
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 467 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).   
In light of these precedents, I disagree with the 
majority’s assertion that the Seventh Circuit “may have read 
Heller too broadly” in Moore.  Maj. Typescript at 11.  For as 
I have explained, other courts, including ours, have read 
Heller the same way.  See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 92; see 
also Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89.  In addition, the majority does 
not support its criticism of Moore with anything but language 
from a previous Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Skoien, 
614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc), that warned readers 
“not to treat Heller as containing broader holdings than the 
Court set out to establish: that the Second Amendment creates 
individual rights, one of which is keeping operable handguns 
at home for self-defense.”  Id. at 640; see Maj. Typescript at 
11.  Although the majority places its emphasis in that passage 
 14 
 
on the words “at home,” perhaps the better place for emphasis 
is on the words “one of which,” especially considering the 
Skoien court’s very next sentence: “What other entitlements 
the Second Amendment creates . . . were left open.”  Skoien, 
614 F.3d at 640.  More importantly, however, it is 
incongruous for the majority to find it only “possible” to 
conclude that Heller implies a right to bear arms beyond the 
home when we have previously indicated that such a right 
“must” exist, at least “to some degree.”12  Marzzarella, 614 
F.3d at 92; see Maj. Typescript at 10.   
In sum, interpreting the Second Amendment to extend 
outside the home is merely a commonsense application of the 
legal principle established in Heller and reiterated in 
McDonald: that “the Second Amendment protects the right to 
keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense.”  
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026.  Because the need for self-
defense naturally exists both outside and inside the home, I 
would hold that the Second Amendment applies outside the 
home.   
IV 
Having concluded that the Second Amendment 
extends outside the home, I now address the majority’s 
holding that New Jersey’s justifiable need requirement does 
not burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment 
                                                 
12
 For the same reasons, the majority’s assertion that 
“it may be more accurate” to discuss whether or not the 
individual right to bear arms for self-defense purposes 
“exists,” rather than whether it “extends,” outside the home 
conflicts with Marzzarella.  See Maj. Typescript at 9 n.5.   
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because it is a longstanding regulation exempt from Second 
Amendment scrutiny.   
In Heller, the Supreme Court cautioned that “nothing 
in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or 
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.”  554 U.S. at 626–27.  Calling these 
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures,”13 the Court also 
noted that the list was not exhaustive.  Id. at 627 n.26.  As we 
noted in Marzzarella, however, “the approach for identifying 
these additional restrictions is also unsettled.”  614 F.3d at 93.  
Observing that “Heller’s identified exceptions all derived 
from historical regulations,” but acknowledging that “it is not 
clear that pre-ratification presence is the only avenue to a 
categorical exception,” we concluded that “prudence counsels 
caution when extending these recognized exceptions to novel 
regulations unmentioned by Heller.”  Id.; see also United 
States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 602 (3d Cir. 2012).   
Our hesitance to recognize additional exceptions is 
unsurprising in light of the fact that by doing so we are 
determining that a certain regulation is completely outside the 
reach of the Second Amendment, not merely that the 
regulation is a permissible burden on the Second Amendment 
                                                 
13
 In Marzzarella, we interpreted the phrase 
“presumptively lawful” to mean that “these longstanding 
limitations are exceptions to the right to bear arms,” although 
we acknowledged that this was not the only reasonable 
interpretation.  614 F.3d at 91.   
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right.  See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91.  Accordingly, it is 
also unsurprising that courts have declined to find that 
regulations not mentioned in Heller fall within its 
“longstandingness” exception without a clear historical 
pedigree.  See, e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 
1244, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Heller II) (declining to 
recognize as longstanding a multitude of District of Columbia 
handgun registration requirements, including laws requiring 
re-registration after three years and requiring applicants to 
demonstrate knowledge about firearms, be fingerprinted and 
photographed, take firearms training or safety courses, meet a 
vision requirement, and submit to a background check every 
six years); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 681 (4th 
Cir. 2010) (declining to recognize as longstanding a law 
prohibiting firearm possession by domestic violence 
misdemeanants because historical data was inconclusive); 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 95 (declining to recognize as 
longstanding a law prohibiting possession of unmarked 
firearms).  And even if some of these courts eventually 
uphold the law at issue, they do so by subjecting it to 
constitutional scrutiny.  See, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 
95–101.  By contrast, courts that have upheld laws by virtue 
of their longstandingness do so on the basis that the court 
“do[es] not have to broaden any of Heller’s presumptively 
valid categories to find that the conduct alleged . . . is outside 
the scope of Second Amendment protection.”  Huet, 665 F.3d 
at 603; see also United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 172 
(3d Cir. 2011).   
Despite the caution that we and other courts have 
counseled, the majority today holds that New Jersey’s 
justifiable need requirement is a longstanding exception to the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms.  It does so mostly on 
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the basis that some form of need requirement has existed in 
New Jersey since 1924.  See Maj. Typescript at 14–15.  But 
the majority’s analysis ignores the major changes that New 
Jersey’s law has undergone in the decades since 1924 and 
also misapprehends the legal standards for deeming a law 
longstanding such that it is beyond the scope of the Second 
Amendment.  A detailed review of the history of New 
Jersey’s gun laws is necessary to explain my first 
disagreement with my colleagues.  I then turn to their 
misapprehension of Heller’s requirements.   
A 
In 1905, New Jersey enacted its first general ban on 
carrying concealed firearms.  Compiled Statutes of New 
Jersey, Vol. II. 1759 (Soney & Sage 1911).  Although the law 
contained an exception whereby a local official could grant a 
permit, there were no standards for issuance.
14
  Id.  In 1924, 
the New Jersey legislature revised the law to incorporate the 
word “need” for the first time.  As amended, the statute 
provided that concealed carry permits would be issued only 
after the issuing officer was “satisfied of the sufficiency of 
the application, and of the need of such person carrying 
concealed upon his person, a revolver, pistol, or other 
firearm.”  Cumulative Supplement to the Compiled Statutes of 
New Jersey, 1911-1924 (Volume I) 844 (Soney & Sage 1925).  
Violation of the permitting requirement was a misdemeanor.  
And critically for our purposes, the permitting requirement 
applied only to the concealed carry of firearms.  Open carry 
                                                 
14
 Several other exceptions existed for certain 
occupations, as well as carry in one’s home or business and 
carry while hunting. 
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was still allowed without a permit (and thus without any 
showing of need).  See State v. Repp, 324 A.2d 588, 592 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (Kole, J.S.C., concurring), rev’d 
352 A.2d 260 (N.J. 1976) (reviewing history).   
In 1966, New Jersey made wholesale revisions to its 
firearms permit laws.  For the first time, the State extended 
the permitting requirement to open carry as well as concealed 
carry.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:151-41 (1966).  In addition, 
the 1966 Act eliminated a single permit to carry and replaced 
it with three distinct types of firearms permits: (1) a permit to 
purchase, which was required to acquire a pistol or revolver; 
(2) a firearms purchaser identification card to acquire a rifle 
or shotgun; and (3) a permit to carry a pistol or revolver.  See 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:151-32–36, 41–45 (1966); Repp, 324 
A.2d at 592 (Kole, J.S.C., concurring) (reviewing history).  
The 1966 Act also made possession of a handgun without a 
permit a felony.   
As for the need requirement, it was first defined in 
Siccardi v. State, 284 A.2d 533 (N.J. 1971).
15
  Although the 
court acknowledged that “need” was somewhat vague, the 
court defined it as “an urgent necessity for carrying guns for 
self-protection.”  Id. at 540.   
In 1979, the law was amended to its current form, 
using the phrase “justifiable need” rather than merely “need.”  
                                                 
15
 Prior to Siccardi, only two cases had mentioned the 
need requirement, and neither had ascribed any meaning to it.  
See McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 162 A.2d 820, 827 (N.J. 1960); 
State v. Neumann, 246 A.2d 533, 535 (Monmouth Cnty. Ct. 
1968).   
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See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4(c) (1979); In re Friedman, 
2012 WL 6049075, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 6, 
2012) (not precedential) (reviewing history).  The New Jersey 
courts have not ascribed any significance to that change of 
phrasing, however.  See Doe v. Dover Twp., 524 A.2d 469, 
470 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (noting that the change 
from “need” to “justifiable need” was “intended basically to 
restate the repealed statutes which were ‘carried forward 
without substantial change’” (quoting 2 Final Report of the 
New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission 370 (1971))). 
In 1990, the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified that 
the “urgent necessity” formulation articulated in Siccardi 
requires applicants to show “specific threats or previous 
attacks demonstrating a special danger to the applicant’s life 
that cannot be avoided by other means” as opposed to 
“[g]eneralized fears for personal safety” or “a need to protect 
property alone.”  Preis, 573 A.2d at 152.  The “urgent 
necessity” test laid out in Siccardi and clarified in Preis 
remains the law to the present day.  See, e.g., Pantano, 60 
A.3d at 510.   
B 
One facet of New Jersey’s history of firearm 
regulation is particularly important to the longstandingness 
inquiry.  Until 1966, New Jersey allowed the open carry of 
firearms without a permit.  Only concealed carry without a 
permit issued upon a showing of need has been banned since 
1924.  This distinction is significant because courts have long 
distinguished between these two types of carry, holding that 
although a State may prohibit the open or concealed carry of 
firearms, it may not ban both because a complete prohibition 
on public carry violates the Second Amendment and 
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analogous state constitutional provisions.  For example, in 
State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840), the Supreme Court of 
Alabama upheld a prohibition on the concealed carrying of 
“any species of fire arms” but cautioned that the State’s 
ability to regulate firearms was not unlimited: “A statute 
which, under the pretence of regulating, amounts to a 
destruction of the right, or which requires arms to be so borne 
as to render them wholly useless for the purpose of defence, 
would be clearly unconstitutional.”  Id. at 614, 616–17.  
Relying on Reid, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a 
statute prohibiting the carrying of concealed pistols was 
unconstitutional insofar as it also “contains a prohibition 
against bearing arms openly.”  Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 
(1846) (emphasis in original).  The Louisiana Supreme Court 
adopted a similar interpretation in State v. Chandler, 5 La. 
Ann. 489 (1850).  There, the court held that a law prohibiting 
the carrying of concealed weapons was constitutional because 
“[i]t interfered with no man’s right to carry arms . . . in full 
open view.”  Id. at 490 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Finally, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that although the 
State could prohibit concealed carry, it could not prohibit all 
carrying of weapons.  Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 180–
82, 186–88 (1871).   
The United States Supreme Court in Heller cited 
Nunn, Chandler, and Andrews as relevant precedents in 
determining the historical meaning of the Second 
Amendment, going so far as to say that the Georgia Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Nunn “perfectly captured the way in which 
the operative clause of the Second Amendment furthers the 
purpose announced in the prefatory clause.”  Heller, 554 U.S. 
at 612; see also id. at 613.  Notably, the Court later described 
the laws struck down in Reid, Nunn, and Andrews as “laws 
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[that] have come close to the severe restriction of the 
District’s handgun ban,” which was struck down as well.  Id. 
at 629.   
The crux of these historical precedents, endorsed by 
the Supreme Court, is that a prohibition against both open and 
concealed carry without a permit is different in kind, not 
merely in degree, from a prohibition covering only one type 
of carry.  After all, if a State prohibits only one type of carry 
without a permit, an opportunity for the free exercise of 
Second Amendment rights still exists.  That opportunity 
disappears when the prohibition is extended to both forms of 
carry.   
The same logic applies to the 1966 New Jersey law.  
Prior to that year, New Jersey prohibited only concealed carry 
without a permit.  Accordingly, individuals were able to 
exercise their Second Amendment rights without first 
obtaining permission from the State.  By enacting a 
prohibition on open carry without a permit in the 1966 law, 
New Jersey eliminated that right.   
Thus, when the majority identifies 1924 as the 
operative date for its longstandingness inquiry, it does so in 
derogation of historical precedents, cited approvingly by the 
Supreme Court in Heller, that draw an important distinction 
between concealed and open carry.  Under these precedents, 
when New Jersey eliminated the ability of its residents to 
openly carry arms without a permit in 1966, it was, as a 
constitutional matter, enacting an entirely new law.   
Regardless of whether we use 1924 or 1966 as the 
operative date, however, the majority misapprehends the legal 
standards applicable to the longstandingness analysis.  
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Because that analysis demonstrates that New Jersey’s 
justifiable need requirement is not sufficiently grounded in 
history and tradition even if retroactive to 1924, I would hold 
that the requirement is not exempt from Second Amendment 
scrutiny.   
C 
As we observed in Marzzarella, “Heller’s identified 
exceptions all derived from historical regulations.”  614 F.3d 
at 93.  Therefore, the majority concentrates on Heller’s 
recognition of “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, as the benchmark against 
which it compares the justifiable need requirement’s 
pedigree.  Maj. Typescript at 17–18 & n.11.  The majority 
cites our opinion in United States v. Barton, in which we 
explained that the “first federal statute disqualifying felons 
from possessing firearms was enacted in 1938” and that 
“Congress did not bar non-violent felons from possessing 
guns until 1961.”  633 F.3d at 173; see Maj. Typescript at 18 
n.11.  According to my colleagues, because “a firearms 
regulation may be ‘longstanding’ and ‘presumptively lawful’ 
even if it was only first enacted in the 20th century,” Maj. 
Typescript at 18 n.11, New Jersey’s justifiable need 
requirement, which, according to their interpretation, has 
existed since 1924, satisfies the standard.  But see Heller II, 
670 F.3d at 1260 & n.* (finding that a District of Columbia 
law prohibiting semi-automatic rifles and large-capacity 
magazines was not longstanding even though the District had 
banned such weapons and ammunition since 1932 and 
Michigan had enacted a similar ban in 1927).   
I perceive several problems with the majority’s 
analysis.  First, it ignores the fact that, as we explained in 
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Barton, the federal felon-in-possession laws have historical 
pedigrees that originated with the founding generation.  
Immediately after discussing the dates of enactment of the 
federal felon-in-possession laws, we noted that “[d]ebates 
from the Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire 
ratifying conventions, which were considered ‘highly 
influential’ by the Supreme Court in Heller, also confirm that 
the common law right to keep and bear arms did not extend to 
those who were likely to commit violent offenses.”  Barton, 
633 F.3d at 173 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 604) (internal 
citation omitted); see also Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640 (“Many of 
the states [in the eighteenth century], whose own constitutions 
entitled their citizens to be armed, did not extend this right to 
persons convicted of crime.”).   
Although “a regulation can be deemed ‘longstanding’ 
even if it cannot boast a precise founding-era analogue,” Nat’l 
Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2012), 
Heller requires, at a minimum, that a regulation be rooted in 
history.  Otherwise, there would have been no point for the 
Court to state that it would “expound upon the historical 
justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and 
when those exceptions come before us,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 
635, and no reason for the Court to describe the exceptions as 
“longstanding,” id. at 626.16   
                                                 
16
 Even if modern laws alone could satisfy the 
longstandingness test, there presumably would have to be a 
strong showing that such laws are common in the states.  Cf. 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 422–26 (2008) (only six 
states permitting death penalty for rape of a child shows 
national consensus against it).  Today, only eight States have 
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Perhaps recognizing that some historical support is 
required, the majority attempts to root New Jersey’s 
justifiable need requirement in history by citing the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Kachalsky for the proposition that “[i]n 
the 19th century, most states enacted laws banning the 
carrying of concealed weapons, and some states went even 
further than prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons 
banning concealable weapons (subject to certain exceptions) 
altogether whether carried openly or concealed.”  Maj. 
Typescript at 15 (citing Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 95–96) 
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).  As 
explained in the previous section, however, laws that banned 
concealed carry alone have little bearing on laws that now 
regulate both concealed and open carry.  In addition, the laws 
that the majority cites which purportedly banned both open 
and concealed carry altogether actually provide little support.  
See Maj. Typescript at 16 (citing Ch. 96, §§ 1–2, 1881 Ark. 
Acts at 191–92; Act of Dec. 2, 1875, ch. 52, § 1, 1876 Wyo. 
Terr. Comp. Laws, at 352; Ch. 13, § 1, 1870 Tenn. Acts at 28; 
Act of Apr. 12, 1871, ch. 34, § 1, 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws at 
25).  The statutes in Arkansas, Texas, and Tennessee were 
upheld only to the extent that they prohibited weapons that 
were not “arms” within the meaning of the Second 
Amendment or their state constitutional analogues (which 
were defined as the arms of a militiaman or a soldier).  See 
                                                                                                             
enacted may-issue permitting regimes like New Jersey’s, 
which condition the issuance of a permit on some showing of 
special need.  By contrast, forty-one States either require no 
permit at all or have enacted shall-issue permitting schemes 
for concealed carry.  And over half the States do not require 
permits for open carry.  See Part I, supra. 
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Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 461 (1876); Andrews, 50 Tenn. at 
186–87; English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 473 (1871); see also 
Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91 n.14.  To the extent that the state 
laws prohibited the carry of weapons used in war, such as a 
full-sized pistol or revolver, they were struck down.  See 
Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557, 559–60 (1878); Fife, 31 Ark. at 
461; Andrews, 50 Tenn. at 186–88.  As one commentator has 
noted, “Heller stated that bans on concealed carry of firearms 
are so traditionally recognized that they must be seen as 
constitutionally permissible. . . .  The same cannot, however, 
be said about general bans on carrying firearms in public, 
which prohibit open as well as concealed carrying.”  Eugene 
Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for 
Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research 
Agenda, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1516 (2009) (footnote 
omitted).   
The greatest flaw I perceive in the majority’s opinion, 
however, is that the longstandingness analysis is conducted at 
too high a level of generality.  Rather than determining 
whether there is a longstanding tradition of laws that 
condition the issuance of permits on a showing of a greater 
need for self-defense than that which exists among the 
general public, the majority chooses as its reference point 
laws that have regulated the public carry of firearms.  This is 
“akin to saying that because the government traditionally 
could prohibit defamation, it can also prohibit speech 
criticizing government officials.”  Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1294 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  In the First Amendment context, 
when determining whether a regulation is longstanding, the 
Supreme Court has looked to that particular type of 
regulation, not to a broader general category.  See Brown v. 
Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2736 (2011) 
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(considering a First Amendment challenge to a ban on sale of 
violent video games: “California’s argument would fare better 
if there were a longstanding tradition in this country of 
specially restricting children’s access to depictions of 
violence, but there is none”); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. 
Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (considering a First Amendment 
challenge to a ban on depictions of animal cruelty: “the 
prohibition of animal cruelty itself has a long history in 
American law, starting with the early settlement of the 
Colonies.  But we are unaware of any similar tradition 
excluding depictions of animal cruelty from ‘the freedom of 
speech’ codified in the First Amendment” (citations omitted) 
(emphasis in original)).  Demonstrating that there has been a 
longstanding tradition of regulating the public carry of 
firearms tells us nothing about whether New Jersey’s 
justifiable need requirement itself is longstanding.   
Finally, the majority’s reference to New York’s 
permitting scheme, which requires a showing of “proper 
cause” and was enacted in 1911, provides no support for its 
conclusion that New Jersey’s justifiable need requirement 
qualifies as longstanding for purposes of the Second 
Amendment.  See Maj. Typescript at 16–18.  The Second 
Circuit in Kachalsky upheld New York’s law because it 
survived intermediate scrutiny, not because it evaded Second 
Amendment cognizance on account of its longstandingness.   
In fact, the Second Circuit found that the cited sources—
including the Arkansas, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming 
statutes cited by the majority—“do not directly address the 
specific question before us: Can New York limit handgun 
licenses to those demonstrating a special need for self-
protection?  Unlike the cases and statutes discussed above, 
New York’s proper cause requirement does not operate as a 
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complete ban on the possession of handguns in public.”  
Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91.  As a result, the court declined to 
find that the law was a longstanding exception to the Second 
Amendment.   
D 
In light of the foregoing, regardless of whether New 
Jersey’s justifiable need requirement dates to 1924 or 1966 
for purposes of the inquiry, there is not a sufficiently 
longstanding tradition of regulations that condition the 
issuance of permits on a showing of special need for self-
defense to uphold New Jersey’s law on that basis.  As we and 
other courts have stated, we must be cautious in recognizing 
new exceptions to the Second Amendment.  After all, finding 
that a regulation is longstanding insulates it from Second 
Amendment scrutiny altogether; it is as good as saying that 
individuals do not have a Second Amendment right to engage 
in conduct burdened by that regulation.  Accordingly, unless 
history and tradition speak clearly, we should hesitate to 
recognize new exceptions.  Because there is no such history 
and tradition here, I would hold that New Jersey’s justifiable 
need requirement is not a longstanding regulation immune 
from Second Amendment scrutiny.   
V 
Having concluded that New Jersey’s justifiable need 
requirement burdens conduct protected by the Second 
Amendment, I now turn to Marzzarella’s second prong, 
which requires us to evaluate the law using some form of 
means-end scrutiny.  Although I agree with the majority that 
intermediate scrutiny applies, I disagree with its conclusion 
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that New Jersey’s justifiable need requirement satisfies that 
standard.
17
   
A 
Under intermediate scrutiny, the State must assert a 
significant, substantial or important interest and there must be 
a reasonable fit between the asserted interest and the 
challenged regulation.  Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98.  “The 
regulation need not be the least restrictive means of serving 
the interest, but may not burden more [conduct] than is 
reasonably necessary.”  Id.  The State bears the burden of 
establishing both of these requirements.  Bd. of Trs. of State 
Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); Chester, 628 
F.3d at 683.   
Because Appellants rightly acknowledge that New 
Jersey’s interest in public safety is significant, substantial, 
and important, I turn to the question of “fit.”  “[S]ince the 
State bears the burden of justifying its restrictions, it must 
affirmatively establish the reasonable fit we require.”  Fox, 
492 U.S. at 480.  Accordingly, we may consider only the 
reasons and the evidence proffered by the State in evaluating 
                                                 
17
 I agree with my colleagues that First Amendment 
prior restraint doctrine does not apply in the Second 
Amendment context.  Although “the First Amendment is a 
useful tool in interpreting the Second Amendment,” 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96 n.15, we have never endorsed a 
wholesale importation of First Amendment principles into the 
Second Amendment.  For instance, in Barton we declined to 
“recognize an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited 
context of the First Amendment.”  633 F.3d at 172 n.3.   
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the fit between the challenged law and the State’s interest.  
The sole reason articulated by New Jersey in this case is that 
the justifiable need requirement is “designed to combat the 
dangers and risks associated with the misuse and accidental 
use of handguns.”  Appellee Br. 34.  According to New 
Jersey, because those risks “are borne not only by the person 
seeking the permit, but by the citizenry he encounters,” 
limiting permits to carry a handgun to those who can show a 
justifiable need to do so serves the State’s interest in public 
safety.  Id.   
At the outset, we should emphasize that the justifiable 
need requirement itself, not the State’s permitting law in 
general, is at issue.  The majority apparently disagrees insofar 
as its opinion focuses on whether permitting schemes in 
general further an interest in public safety.  By doing so, I 
submit that the majority misapprehends the regulation under 
review.  Appellants take no issue with permits in general or 
with the other objective requirements that an applicant must 
satisfy prior to obtaining a handgun carry permit, such as 
background checks, safety courses, and qualification tests.  
Rather, the regulation at issue is the requirement to show 
justifiable need, that is, that the applicant has a special need 
for self-defense greater than that which exists among the 
general public.  Preis, 573 A.2d at 152.  Accordingly, our 
inquiry must focus on that requirement.  To be precise, we 
must ask whether the State has justified its conclusion that 
those with a special need for self-defense are less likely to 
misuse or accidentally use a handgun than those who do not 
have a special need.   
Although the State must show only a “reasonable” fit, 
New Jersey comes nowhere close to making the required 
showing.  Indeed, New Jersey has presented no evidence as to 
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how or why its interest in preventing misuse or accidental use 
of handguns is furthered by limiting possession to those who 
can show a greater need for self-defense than the typical 
citizen.
18
   
The majority excuses the State for this evidentiary 
void by reference to the fact that Heller was not decided until 
2008 and that the Second Amendment had not been 
incorporated against the States until 2010.  “Simply put,” the 
majority states, “New Jersey’s legislators could not have 
known that they were potentially burdening protected Second 
Amendment conduct, and as such we refuse to hold that the 
fit here is not reasonable merely because New Jersey cannot 
identify a study or tables of crime statistics upon which it 
based its predictive judgment.”  Maj. Typescript at 26–27.   
Even if one were to ignore the fact that people bore 
and desired to bear firearms in New Jersey in the decades 
prior to Heller, the lack of legislative history surrounding the 
State’s enactment of the justifiable need requirement is not 
the chief problem with the State’s showing.  To be clear, New 
Jersey has provided no evidence at all to support its proffered 
justification, not just no evidence that the legislature 
considered at the time the need requirement was enacted or 
amended.  The majority errs in absolving New Jersey of its 
obligation to show fit.  Our role is to evaluate the State’s 
proffered evidence, not to accept reflexively its litigation 
                                                 
18
 The majority acknowledges this evidentiary void, 
see Appellees’ Feb. 23, 2013 Letter at 1–2, although my 
colleagues characterize the State’s failure too charitably: “To 
be sure, New Jersey has not presented us with much evidence 
. . . .”  Maj. Typescript at 25 (emphasis added).   
 
 31 
 
position.  See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1259 (holding that the 
government had not borne its burden under intermediate 
scrutiny because “the District needs to present some 
meaningful evidence, not mere assertions, to justify its 
predictive judgments”); Chester, 628 F.3d at 683 (holding 
that the government had not borne its burden under 
intermediate scrutiny because “[t]he government has offered 
numerous plausible reasons why the disarmament of 
domestic violence misdemeanants is substantially related to 
an important government goal; however, it has not attempted 
to offer sufficient evidence to establish a substantial 
relationship between [18 U.S.C.] § 922(g)(9) and an 
important governmental goal” (emphasis in original)).  
“Without pointing to any study, empirical data, or legislative 
findings,” New Jersey submits merely “that the fit [i]s a 
matter of common sense.”  United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 
411, 419 (4th Cir. 2012).  Under these circumstances, the 
State has not carried its burden to “affirmatively establish the 
reasonable fit we require.”  Fox, 492 U.S. at 480; see, e.g., 
Carter, 669 F.3d at 419; Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1259; Chester, 
628 F.3d at 683.   
Even were we to deem adequate the State’s proffered 
reasons alone, without any supporting evidence, there still 
would be no reasonable fit between the justifiable need 
requirement and the State’s interest in “combating the 
dangers and risks associated with the misuse and accidental 
use of handguns.”  Appellee Br. 34.  The fact that one has a 
greater need for self-defense tells us nothing about whether he 
is less likely to misuse or accidentally use handguns.  This 
limitation will neither make it less likely that those who meet 
the justifiable need requirement will accidentally shoot 
themselves or others, nor make it less likely that they will 
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turn to a life of crime.  Put simply, the solution is unrelated to 
the problem it intends to solve.  Our inquiry here focuses on 
the way New Jersey has sought to address the societal ills of 
misuse and accidental use (by giving permits only to those 
who have a greater need for self-defense), not on whether 
New Jersey has an interest in combating these problems.  
Limiting permits to those who can show a greater need for 
self-defense than the public at large does not make it less 
likely that misuse and accidental use will occur.  In fact, that 
proposition is counterintuitive.  Misuse and accidental use 
presuppose the active handling of handguns and it seems odd 
to suggest that one who obtains a handgun carry permit 
because he is in imminent danger is less likely to handle a 
gun than one who obtains a carry permit because he might 
want to exercise that right in the future even though he 
perceives no present danger.   
An example demonstrates the absence of a fit between 
the justifiable need requirement and reducing misuse or 
accidental use of handguns.  Imagine that a 21-year-old with 
no criminal record is shot in the leg while leaving his home in 
a high-crime area.  Citing the portion of the justifiable need 
requirement that allows handgun permit issuance to those 
who have suffered from previous attacks, he applies for and is 
granted a permit to carry a handgun.  Unbeknownst to the 
permitting officials, however, the 21-year-old is a street-level 
drug dealer who wants the gun to retaliate against the rival 
who shot him.  It borders on the absurd to believe that this 21-
year-old is less likely to misuse or accidentally use a handgun 
than a reserve sheriff’s deputy who wishes to carry a gun for 
self-defense while off duty, like Appellant Finley Fenton; or a 
civilian FBI employee who received specific information that 
a terrorist organization might target him or his family, like 
 33 
 
former Appellant Daniel Piszczatoski; or an owner of an 
ATM restocking company who routinely carries large 
amounts of cash, like Appellant John Drake.   
The counterintuitiveness of the idea that limiting 
handguns to those who have a special need for self-defense 
reduces misuse or accidental use is borne out by the 
experience of other States that issue handgun permits on a 
shall-issue basis, which is what New Jersey’s Handgun 
Permit Law would look like without the justifiable need 
requirement.  For example, Florida has issued 2,525,530 
handgun carry licenses since 1987.  Concealed Weapon or 
Firearm License Summary Report, http://licgweb.doacs. 
state.fl.us/stats/cw_monthly.pdf (last visited July 16, 2013).  
To date, Florida has revoked only 168 licenses—0.00665%—
for crimes involving firearms.  Id.  In Texas, of the 63,679 
criminal convictions (not just those in which firearms were 
used) in 2011, only 120—0.1884%—were attributed to 
individuals licensed to carry handguns.  Conviction Rates for 
Concealed Handgun License Holders, 
http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/
RSD/CHL/Reports/ConvictionRatesReport2011.pdf (last 
visited July 16, 2013).   
In addition, although not all States keep detailed 
statistics on crimes committed by permit holders, many States 
keep statistics on permit revocations.  For instance, Michigan 
issued 87,637 permits for the year ending June 30, 2011, but 
revoked only 466 of them.  Concealed Pistol Licensure 
Annual Report, http://www.michigan.gov/
documents/msp/2011_CPL_Report_376632_7.pdf (last 
visited July 16, 2013).  Tennessee issued 94,975 handgun 
carry permits in 2011, suspended only 896, and revoked just 
97.  Tennessee Handgun Carry Permit Statistics, 
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http://www.tn.gov/safety
/stats/DL_Handgun/Handgun/HandgunReport2011Full.pdf 
(last visited July 16, 2013).  North Carolina has issued 
228,072 permits in the last 15 years but has revoked only 
1,203.  North Carolina Concealed Handgun Permit Statistics 
by County, http://www.ncdoj.gov/CHPStats.aspx (last visited 
July 16, 2013).  The reasons for these revocations are unclear, 
but even if we assumed that all of them were because of 
misuse or accidental use of handguns, the rate in Michigan 
and North Carolina is 0.5%, and in Tennessee it is 0.1%. 
Irrespective of what other States have done, New 
Jersey has decided that fewer handguns legally carried in 
public means less crime.  And despite its assertion that the 
justifiable need requirement is specifically targeted to 
reducing misuse and accidental use, it is obvious that the 
justifiable need requirement functions as a rationing system 
designed to limit the number of handguns carried in New 
Jersey.  The New Jersey courts have admitted as much.  See, 
e.g., State v. Valentine, 307 A.2d 617, 619 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1973) (“[T]he overriding philosophy of our 
Legislature is to limit the use of guns as much as possible.”); 
see also Siccardi, 284 A.2d at 540 (“[W]idespread handgun 
possession in the streets, somewhat reminiscent of frontier 
days, would not be at all in the public interest.”).  Even 
assuming that New Jersey is correct to conclude that fewer 
guns means less crime, a rationing system that burdens the 
exercise of a fundamental constitutional right by simply 
making that right more difficult to exercise cannot be 
considered reasonably adapted to a governmental interest 
because it burdens the right too broadly.  See Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 783 (1989) (under 
intermediate scrutiny, the means chosen to achieve the 
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desired governmental objective may not be “substantially 
broader than necessary”).  The regulation must be more 
targeted than that to meet intermediate scrutiny.
19
   
Those who drafted and ratified the Second 
Amendment were undoubtedly aware that the right they were 
establishing carried a risk of misuse, and States have 
considerable latitude to regulate the exercise of the right in 
ways that will minimize that risk.  But States may not seek to 
reduce the danger by curtailing the right itself.  This point is 
made starker by the fact that the other requirements in New 
Jersey’s permit law display a closer fit with the articulated 
interest of reducing misuse and accidental use.  For example, 
New Jersey conducts a criminal background check and 
requires applicants to complete a training course, pass a test 
of the State’s laws governing the use of force, and provide 
qualification scores from test firings administered by a 
certified instructor.  Appellants have challenged none of these 
regulations.   
In sum, New Jersey has not carried its burden to 
demonstrate that the justifiable need requirement is 
                                                 
19
 To be clear, New Jersey need not show that the 
justifiable need requirement is the least restrictive means of 
combating the dangers of misuse and accidental use.  Rather, 
New Jersey fails to meet its burden under intermediate 
scrutiny both because there is no reasonable fit between the 
justifiable need requirement and the State’s asserted interest 
in combating misuse and accidental use of handguns, and 
because New Jersey’s desire to ration handgun use too 
broadly burdens conduct protected by the Second 
Amendment.   
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reasonably adapted to its interest in reducing the misuse or 
accidental use of handguns.  Accordingly, the justifiable need 
requirement fails intermediate scrutiny and contravenes the 
Second Amendment.   
B 
The majority reaches the opposite conclusion by 
stressing deference to the New Jersey legislature and by 
declining to examine the justifiable need requirement itself in 
favor of examining the permitting requirement as a whole.  
Maj. Typescript at 24 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (Turner II)).  Having already 
addressed the majority’s error with respect to the level of 
generality of its analysis, a few words about deference are in 
order.   
Although the majority is correct that we “‘accord 
substantial deference to the predictive judgments’ of the 
legislature, [New Jersey] is not thereby ‘insulated from 
meaningful judicial review.’”  Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1259 
(quoting Turner II, 520 U.S. at 195, and Turner Broad. Sys., 
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994) (Turner I) (controlling 
opinion of Kennedy, J.)).  “Rather, we must ‘assure that, in 
formulating its judgments, the legislature has drawn 
reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.’”  Id. 
(quoting Turner II, 520 U.S. at 195) (alteration omitted).  By 
deferring absolutely to the New Jersey legislature, the 
majority abdicates its duty to apply intermediate scrutiny and 
effectively applies the rational basis test, contrary to the 
Supreme Court’s explicit rejection of that test in the Second 
Amendment context.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27.   
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Such deference is not consistent with intermediate 
scrutiny because that standard places the burden of 
establishing both elements of its test—an important interest 
and a reasonable fit that does not burden more conduct than 
reasonably necessary—on the State.  See Fox, 492 U.S. at 
480.  The majority says that “New Jersey legislators . . . have 
made a policy judgment that the state can best protect public 
safety by allowing only those qualified individuals who can 
demonstrate a ‘justifiable need’ to carry a handgun to do so,” 
and says that this determination (and others that it notes) lead 
it to “refuse Appellants’ invitation to intrude upon the sound 
judgment and discretion of the State of New Jersey.”  Maj. 
Typescript at 29, 31.  Yet the majority never discusses 
whether those judgments violate the Constitution.  It makes 
no mention of New Jersey’s articulated policy interest in 
reducing the misuse or accidental use of handguns, it says 
nothing about whether limiting handguns to those who can 
show a greater need for self-defense is reasonably related to 
that interest, and it does not adhere to the fact that the State 
bears the burden of proving the justifiable need requirement’s 
constitutionality.   
It is also notable that the majority’s version of 
deference to the New Jersey legislature is akin to engaging in 
the very type of balancing that the Heller Court explicitly 
rejected.  The majority states: 
It is New Jersey’s judgment that when an 
individual carries a handgun in public for his or 
her own defense, he or she necessarily exposes 
members of the community to a somewhat 
heightened risk that they will be injured by that 
handgun.  New Jersey has decided that this 
somewhat heightened risk to the public may be 
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outweighed by the potential safety benefit to an 
individual with a “justifiable need” to carry a 
handgun. 
Maj. Typescript at 29.   
By deferring to New Jersey’s judgment that the 
justifiable need requirement is the provision that can best 
determine whether the individual right to keep and bear arms 
“outweighs” the increased risk to the community that its 
members will be injured by handguns, the majority employs 
an “‘interest-balancing inquiry’ that ‘asks whether the statute 
burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out 
of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other 
important governmental interests.’”  Heller, 554 U.S. at 634 
(quoting id. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).  The Heller 
Court rejected this sort of balancing inquiry as inconsistent 
with the very idea of constitutional rights.  Id. at 634–35.   
The majority’s failure to analyze the constitutional fit 
between the justifiable need requirement and New Jersey’s 
articulated interest in reducing the misuse or accidental use of 
firearms is thus especially troubling.  Only by engaging in a 
true fit analysis are we faithful both to the Supreme Court’s 
rejection of naked interest balancing and to its reminder that 
the Second Amendment is “not a right to keep and carry any 
weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for 
whatever purpose.”  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.   
*  *  * 
Gun violence is an intractable problem throughout the 
United States.  In 2011 alone, 6,220 people were murdered by 
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handguns,
20
 and although many of the perpetrators of 
handgun homicides undoubtedly were unlicensed criminals, it 
is safe to assume that some of the perpetrators were licensed 
to carry.  New Jersey has sought to protect its citizens by 
reducing the number of guns carried in public.  In the bygone 
era when the Bill of Rights acted as a check solely on federal 
power, New Jersey could regulate guns as it saw fit.  In the 
post-incorporation era, however, New Jersey must comply 
with the Second Amendment.   
Federal judges must apply the Constitution and the 
precedents of the Supreme Court regardless of what each 
judge might believe as a matter of policy or principle.  See 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420–21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“The hard fact is that sometimes we must make 
decisions we do not like.  We make them because they are 
right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as 
we see them, compel the result.”).  No matter how laudable 
the end, the Supreme Court has long made clear that the 
Constitution disables the government from employing certain 
means to prevent, deter, or detect violent crime.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27 (2001); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see also Heller II, 670 
F.3d at 1296 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  And the Court has 
been equally clear that the courts must enforce constitutional 
                                                 
20
 FBI Uniform Crime Reports, Crime in the United 
States 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-
the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/expanded-
homicide-data-table-8 (last visited July 16, 2013). 
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rights even when they have “controversial public safety 
implications.”  McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3045 (controlling 
opinion of Alito, J.); see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (“We 
are aware of the problem of handgun violence in this country, 
and we take seriously the concerns raised by the many amici 
who believe that prohibition of handgun ownership is a 
solution. . . .  But the enshrinement of constitutional rights 
necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.”).  
Because I am convinced that New Jersey’s justifiable need 
requirement unconstitutionally burdens conduct protected by 
the Second Amendment as interpreted in Heller and 
McDonald, I respectfully dissent.   
